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CITIZENSHIP AND DEPORTATION
By ARNOLD LEvANDosKI
The question of citizenship, the nature and attributes there-
of, and the rights thereunder, has for many decades provided a
fertile field for the exercise of judicial functions. It is perhaps
a matter of common knowledge that there has always been a
public demand for the removal of "undesirables" from the con-
fines of our United States. However the advent of "racketeer-
ing" and the "crime wave" of recent years which is so emphati-
cally claimed to have hit our country has caused somewhat of
a revival of public interest in the ever present desire to deport
and forbid the reentrance of undesirables. To the desire of the
Pacific coast to control the encroaching Chinese population is
nomW added the nation-wide interest in the removal of the hab-
itual criminal. Hence a subject which was at one time more or
less localized and sectional has now become one of national inter-
est because of recently developed conditions. It is unmistak-
able, therefore, that the question of citizenship and deportation
is one of current national interst.
In determining the nature of citizenship, and its qualifica-
tions first resort is had to the Constitution of the United States.
The Constitution contemplates two sources of citizenship. The
fourteenth article of Amendment declares that "all persons born
or naturalized in the United States, alhd subject to the jurisdiction
therof, are citizens of the United States and of the State where-
in they reside." Other provisions of the Constitution guarantee
certain rights to "citizens" but only in the above quoted provi-
sion, the Fourteenth Amendment, is there to be found any
definition of the term "citizenship."
By necessary resort to the common law it is found that the
fundamental principle of nationality is "birth within allegiance"
of the king. This principle embraced persons born within the
allegiance of the king and subject to his protection. Allegiance
and protection should be mutual and hence it may be said that
a person born within the allegiance of a given sovereign and en-
titled to his protection is a citizen thereof. This principle is un-
doubtedly the basis for Mr. Justice Story's statement that "two
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things concur to create citizenship:.. ..... birth within the
dominions of the sovereign and . ....... within the protection of
and obedience to the sovereign."' That this principle is affirmed
by the Constitution .ol the United States is held in the leading
case of United States V Wong Kim Ark. (42 L. Ed. 890)
The words "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States"
are held in Elk V Wilkins (112 U. S. 494) to mean completely
subject to the political jurisdiction of the United States, and
owing them direct and immediate allegiance. Hence a person
born in the United States under conditions where the sovereign
power is understood to cede part of its territorial jurisdiction (as
children born of a foreign ambassador) is not a citizen of the
United States by virtue of birth therein.
The alternative method of securing citizenship as contem-
plated by the Constitution is by "naturalization." The Con-
stitution confers upon Congress the power to pass a uniform
law governing this method of acquiring citizenship. Until re-
cently a third method of securing citizenship, a method indepen-
dent of the constitution, was in force by virtue of the familiar
principle that the citizenship of a married woman is that of her
husband. This principle is now abrogated by an act of Congress
which provides that "any woman who marries a citizen of the
United States after September 22, 1922, or any woman whose
husband is naturalized after that date, shall not become a citizen
by reason of such marriage or naturalization; but if eligible to
citizenship she may become naturalized.2 Further provision de-
clares that "the right of any woman to become a naturalized
citizn of the United States shall not be abriged because of her
sex or because she is a married woman." (Prior to 1922 the
alien wife of an alien husband could not become a naturalized
citizen of the United States.)
Citizens by virtue of being such are guaranteed certain
rights, priveleges and immunities by the Constitution. A ques-
tion within the purview of this article which presents itself at
the outset is, Is a citizen of the United States subject to depor-
tation by the United States? . Although there is no express pro-
vision in so many words that citizens are not subject to deporta-
I Tnglis v Sailors' Snug Harbor 7 L. Ed. 617.
2 Section 368; Title 8, U. S. Code Ann.
$ Section 367, Title 8, U. S. Code Ann.
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tion, yet such a conclusion can reasonably be reached. Oper-
ative facts that lead to such a conclusion are as follows:
All acts of Congress providing for deportation are directed
toward aliens only, and there is apparently not one single instance
in which Congress has attempted to provide for the deportation
of a citizen. With regard to the power of Congress to lawfully
pass an act providing for the deportation of a citizen the Su-
preme Court of the United States has declared that "if the Ex-
clusion act of 1888 is intended to apply to citizens of the United
States of Chinese descent it so far beyond the power of Con-
gress to enact and is therefore unconstitutional and void."4 In
another case it is held that "where one establishes his birth by
uncontradicted testimony, deportation is unwarranted."5  An-
other decision holds that "the authorities are clear that the de-
fendant being the wife of an American citizen, her citizenship is
that of her husband and she cannot be deported. ' 6 It is, therefore,
quite conclusive, to use the words of a United States Supreme
Court, that "a citizen by birth is not subject to deportation at
all,"7 and generally speaking a citizen by naturalization is on a
par in every respect with a citizen by birth. Citizens of the
United States are by Constitutional provision guaranteed all
the "privileges and immunities" of a citizen of the United States.
Can it not be argued that one of these privileges is the right to
remain in the United States? Does not the approved definition
of the word "citizen" contain as an element the right to the pro-
tection of the sovereign p6wer within whose confines he was
born? Further, according to the Declaration of Independence
everyone has the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of hap-
piness. Can it not be said that citizenship is the sum total of
all the natural rights plus the right to exercise them in the United
States?
No citizen of the United States who has absented himself
is denied the right to reenter.8 This statement may be chal-
lenged on the grounds that a citizen of the United States was
4 In re Yung Sing Hee 36 Fed. 437.
.iMoy Suey V U. S. 147 Fed. 697, U. S. V Horn Lir 214 Fed. 456.
6 Spruniz V Martin 182 Fed. 330 NOTE: This case was decided before
the Act of 1922 supra, giving separate citizenship to married women.
7 U. S. ex rel. Huber v Sibray 178 Fed. 150 In re Nicola
8 U. S. v Wong Kim Ark (supra) In re Yung Sing Hee (supra)
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actually denied the right to reexiter the United States. Section
3959 Compiled Statutes provides that when any naturalized
citizen shall reside for two years in the state from which he came
it will be presumed that he has ceased to be an American citizen,
provided however that such may be overcome by presentation of
satisfactory evidence . In the cases in which the right
of reentrance was denied., it was so done because of the inability
to overcome the presumption that the party was not a citizen of
the United States. Further it must be remembered that these
cases dealt only with naturalized citizens. It is quite apparent
that unless there is a positive and affirmative act on the part of
the citizen to give up his or her citizenship, the right of reentry
cannot be denied.9 Conceding the fact that a citizen cannot
be denied the right to reenter can it not be likewise said that a
citizen cannot be deported?
To support the conclusion that a citizen cannot be deported
or denied the right to reenter, the language of the United States
Supreme Court in the case of In re Yung Sing Hee (supra) may
be appropiately quoted. It is there said "if the Exclusion Acts
purport to exclude from the United States descendants of Chinese
born within the United States and such legislative act attempts
to banish a citizen of the United States for any cause or no cause
at all because of race or color, it is a bill of attainder within the
constitutional prohibition." A bill of attainder is a legislative
act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial. Laws im-
posing civil disabilities or punishment for past acts are held to
-be ex. pos.facto.-
It does not necessarily follow from the fact that a citizen
cannot be deported, or denied the right of reentry, that he or she
cannot be deprived of the status as such and hence be subject to
deportation on grounds of not being a citizen of the United States.
Thus we are brought to the question of how citizenship may be
lost. In II Corpus Juris at page 785 it is said that a direct loss
of citizenship is effected by either expatriation or by marriage of
a woman to an alien. With regard to the latter a federal statute
of 1907 provides, in substance, that at the termination of such
marital relationship, such a woman has an option to reacquire
9 In re Wildeberger 214 Fed. 508 Ex rel. Anderson V Howe 231 Fed. 546.
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her Amherican citizenship, but in 1922 Congress declared that
"a woman citizen of the United States shall not lose her citizen-
ship by marriage to an alien unless she makes a formal renun-
ciation before a competent tribunal, provided that any woman
marrying an alien ineligible to citizenship shall cease to be a
citizen, or if during the continuance of such marital relationship
she resides continually for two years in a foreign state of which
her husband is a citizen, or for five years outside the United
States she shall be subject to the presumption that she had
expatriated herself as provided in the statute of 1907. Further,
in Corpus Juris it is said that loss of citizenship may be provided
as punishment of a crime after due conviction thereof, citing
Gotcheus v Matheson, 52, Barb. 152. This case involves a federal
statute which in substance declares that as an additional punish-
ment for desertion from military service forfeiture of citizenship
shall be declared. The act unquestionably was designed to pre-
vent desertion and induce the return of those who rad already
deserted the service. Although the United States Supreme
Court has never been called upon to decide the constitutionality
of the act, the question arose in a state court in somewhat of
an indirect manner.
Shortly after the passage af that act an alleged deserter was
denied the right to vote at an election and he brought suit against
the election of commisioners. In this case the constitutionality of
the act was attacked on three grounds: First that it was an ex
post facto law, secondly that it attempted to regulate sufferage
within the State, thirdly that it proposes to inflict pains and penal-
ties upon the offenders before and without a trial and conviction
by due process of law, and prohibited by the Bill of rights. The
court disposed of the first ground assigned by holding that the
penalty inflicted by the act is not imposed for the original crime
but for the persistence in the crime, i. e., for failure to return to
the service, and that it is not therefore an ex post facto law. The
act was held to be prospective in operation. In considering the
second ground assigned the court said "Congress can deprive an
individual of the opportunity to enjoy a right that belongs to
him as a citizen, and this is different from the taking away of
the right itself, or merly impairing it. A voter may be impris-
oned for a crime against the United States but this is not impair-
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
ing his right of sufferage."Then Justice Strong says, "I cannot
doubt that as a penalty for a crime against the general govern-
ment, Congress may impose on the criminal a forfeiture of his
citizenship of the United States. Disfranchisement of a citizen
of the United States as punishment for a crime is no unusual
mode of punishment (Barker v People 20 Johnson 458)" The
statute was held unconstitutional on the third ground assigned
in that the voter was nt judicially convicted of desertion, and
it was expressly held that he could not be adjudged guilty of
desertion by the election commissioners and denied the right to
vote.10
The case, although holding that Congress may deprive a
citizen of the opportunity to exercise a right as a citizen, seems
likewise to hold that Congress cannot deprive the citizen of the
right itself. It appears to the writer this court holds that Con-
gress cannot deprive a citizen of his citizenship, notwithstanding
the phrase "I cannot doubt the right of Congress to impose a
forfeiture of citizenship as penalty for a crime" to the contrary;
and this for two reasons: first, the context of the opinion shows
that a strict and literal meaning of the words quoted, standing
alone, was not intended, secondly, the case is cited only for the
proposition that one cannot be deemed to have forfeited his
citizenship without a conviction of desertion.
The federal statute involved in the case just discussed was
passed in 1865. In 1866 the state of Pennsylvania by an act of
its legislature, supplemental in nature to the federal act, declared
in substance that no person guilty of desertion shall vote, and
that a report by any provost that a certain person is a deserter
was to be deemed evidence of desertion sufficient to bar the
right to vote. An alleged deserter being denied the right to
vote, the question came up once more before the Pennsylvania
court. Although the Pennsylvania act of 1866, and not the fed-
eral act of 1865, was primarily involved in the controversey the
statement of that Supreme Court serves to justify the construc-
tion placed upon the case last discussed (Huber v Riley 53 Penn.
St. 112), as well as sustain the conclusion that Congress cannot
deprive a person of his citizenship and thus make him subject to
io Huber v Riley 53 Penn. St. 112.
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deportation. That court in the second case says,"this act denies
the rights of the electors to all who under the act of Congress
have been registered 'as deserters from military service even
though there is no conviction of desertion and so is unconsti-
tutional. (Citing Huber v Riley) It attempts to disfranchise
those who are enfranchised by the fundamentdl law of the com-
monwealth. It is not only a regulation of the mode of exercise,
but it is a deprivation of the right itself. The legislature cannot
take away from an elector his right to vote if he posseses the
qualifications required by the Constitution. If such were not
so the legislative power would be superior to the organic law of
the state, and the legislature instead of being controlled by it
would mould the Constitution at its pleasure. Such is not the
law. A right conferred by the constitution is beyond reach of
legislative interference. It is in the nature of a constitutional
grant of powers or of priviledges that cannot be taken away by
any authority known to the government."'
The only other case relevant to the subject under examina-
tion, which could be found by the writer, is to the effect that no
mere act if state legislation can per se denationalize a citizen
without his concurrence. 2 Voluntary rebellion cannot by Legis-
lative act, be made involuntary expatrcation an act of legislature
depriving persons adhering to the Confederacy, of their citizen-
ship is a act of attainder. This case appears to uphold the view
that it is properly within the jurisdiction of a state to provide a
general law which will disfranchise its citizens, but that a state
has no power to deprive a citizen of his citizenship in the United
States. These cases, although not conclusive as to this question
in that they were not decided by the Federal Supreme Court
provide the only judicial expression on the subject.
That Congress cannot pass an act which will arbitrarily
denationalize a citizen is further supported by a holding that al-
legiance may be dissolved by the mutual consent of the govern-
ment and its citizens.' 3, In Black's Constitutional Law P. 254
it is said that "citizenship as such can never be forfeited by
voluntary renunciation of the party. There is no constitutional
ii McCafferty V Guyer 59 Penn. St. 109 Moy Suey V U. S. (supra)
12 Burkett V McCarty 73 IXy. 758.
13 Inglis v Sailors' S. Harb La wEd. 617.
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way in which the United States, or a state could reduce a person
enjoying the character of citizen to the standing of an alien."
That a citizen is subject to involuntary expatriation would be
inconsistent with the principle that the right of expatriation is
a natural and inherent right in the people.4 That such is a nat-
ural and inherent right is declared by Congress expressly in the
provision that "any declaration, instruction, opinion, order or de-
cision of any officer of the United States which denies, restricts,
impairs or questions the right of expatriation, is inconsistent
with the fundamental principles of the Republic."'15 Cases hold
that expatriation can be effected by only a showing of a clear
intention to relinquish American citizenship.16
To the conclusion that Congress cannot deprive a citizen of
his citizenship the language of Justice Gray in the case of United
States V Wong Kim Ark (holding that a citizen cannot be denied
the right to reenter) serves as a fitting close. "The power of
naturalization vested in Congress by the Constitution is a power
to confer citizenship, not a power to take it away. Congress
having no power to abridge the rights conferred by the constitu-
tion upon those who have become naturalized citizens, a fortiori
no act or omission of Congress providing for naturalization can
effect citizenship acquired as a birth right by virtue of the Con-
stitution without any aid of legislation. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment while it has conferred the power in Congress to regulate
naturalization, it has conferred no authority upon Congress to
restrict the effect of birth declared by the Constitution to consti-
tute a sufficient and complete right to citizenship."
In spite of this positive language of Justice Gray there is
reasonable ground to believe that Congress can lawfully pass an
act providing that a citizen shall have'forfeited his status as a
citizen upon due conviction in a competent court of a certain
specified crime or crimes, and such finds support in judicial ex-
pression in several instances, providing of course that such an
act of Congress would be prospective and not retrospective in
view. In this respect it must be noticed that all cases cited hereto-
fore in this article were without exception coses in which there
14 U. S. ex rel Anderson V Howe 231 Fed. 546.
15 l1vised Statutes U. S. No. 1999.
16 Phelps V Jackson (supra).
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was no judicial conviction of any crime or statute, and hence it
may be appropiately argued that the language of the respective
courts in these cases holding that a citizen could not be deemed to
have forfeited his citizenship referred exclusively only to instan-
ces in which there was no conviction by a proper tribunal upon
which to base a forfeiture of citizenship, and that, and as such are
not indicative of what the courts might say if an act as here pro-
posed would be passed by Congress.
That Congress has the power to pass such an act can be
implied from the language of Justice Robertson of the Kentucky
Supreme Court: "Compulsive excission of a citizen because of
his joining the Confederate army cannot be costitutionally in-
flicted without judicial conviction of some crime or act denounced
by legislation as a forfeiture of citizenship.' 7
Justice Agnew in the dissenting opinion in the McCafferty
case (regarding forfeiture of citizenship as penalty for desertion)
says 'the power of Congress to enforce military service being es-
tablished the extent of the penalty is within the discretion of the
law making power whether it be forfeiture life, property, or the
lose of citizenship." It is there further said that deprivation
of citizenship is not the deprivation of a right within Constitu-
tional protection. Citizenship not being a natural right, it re-
sults from the-government and is regulated by the rule of the
country in which it is claimed."
In the Huber V Reilly case justice Strong said "I cannot
doubt that as a penalty for a crime against the General govern-
ment Congress may impose a criminal forfeiture of his citizenship
in the United States."
It thus appears that the question is undoubtedly an open
one, and in view of the fact that there are contradictory state-
ments made by highly respectable authorities one is at liberty
to adopt either view and have sustenance of judicial opinion.
In the last analysis the question seems to resolve itself down to
this "Is citizenship a natural and inherent right and so secure
from involuntary destruction or forfeiture as distinguished from
disfranchisement?"'1  That it is is so declared by theUnited
17 Burkett v McCarty (supra).
18 See "Disfranchisement" Sect. 254 Blacks Constitutional Law.
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States Supreme Court in the following language: "Nativity gives
citizenship arfd is a right under the Constitution. It is a right
which Congress would be without the Constitutional power to
curtail or give away."'19
io Moy Suey v U. S. (supra)
